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ARTICLE

F(R)EE EXPRESSION?
RECONCILING COPYRIGHT AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
Raymond Shih Ray Kul

INTRODUCTION

Modem copyright law and the freedom of speech protected by the
First Amendment exist in an unresolved state of conflict. By
definition, copyright's creation of judicially enforceable exclusive
rights to creative works restricts the freedom of individuals to
communicate with those works. By punishing speakers for their
choice of message, authorizing prior restraints upon speech and the
destruction of books, and imposing civil and criminal liability upon
speakers and publishers, copyright appears to strike directly at the
core of free speech rights. And, "[r]ead literally, the First Amendment
would invalidate the Copyright Act." 1 Yet, copyright laws exist, and
for over two hundred years, Congress has chosen to expand
copyright.
Surprisingly, judicial and scholarly recognition of this conflict is a
relatively recent phenomenon. Despite the fact that the principles
embodied in copyright law and the First Amendment have been part
of the U.S. Constitution since the late eighteenth century, almost two
hundred years elapsed before courts and scholars began to examine
their relationship. As illustrated by the seminal works of Professors
t Professor of Law and Associate Director, Center for Law, Technology & the Arts, Case
Western Reserve University School of Law. This essay is influenced by and indebted to the
work of L. Ray Patterson and C. Edwin Baker, though any mistakes in reasoning or argument
are of course my own.
I Brief of Gannett Co., Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at *6, Harper
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (No. 83-1632), 1984 WL
566002.

864

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:4

Nimmer and Denicola, initially, the scholarly literature denied any
conflict between copyright and the First Amendment, suggesting
instead that the two are complementary. According to this view, both
promote speech. If the First Amendment prevents government
interference in the marketplace of ideas, copyright makes such
markets possible by creating economic incentives to speak and
publish. To the extent that occasional conflicts may arise, the
complementary approach argues that copyright's internal limits,
especially those found in the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use,
allay residual First Amendment concerns.
In the first case in which the Supreme Court was asked to
reconcile free speech with copyright, the Court followed the
complementary approach suggesting that there was no conflict or
tension. In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion emphasized that, "[i]n our haste
to disseminate news, it should not be forgotten that the Framers
intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression., 3 The
Court went on to note that copyright already embodied First
Amendment protections "in the Copyright Act's distinction between
copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the
latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair
use." 4 Consequently, additional First Amendment scrutiny was
unnecessary.
Despite, or arguably because of, the complementary approach and
the Supreme Court's conclusion that the Framers intended copyright
and free speech to be twin engines of free expression, the conflict
between copyright and free speech remains. Moreover, with the
introduction of the Internet and the growing use of digital technology,
conflicts between the two are arguably increasing as individuals who
prior to these technologies generally operated below copyright's radar
become the targets of copyright claims for activities ranging from file
sharing, creating pages on social networking sites like Facebook and
MySpace, and blogging and posting content on YouTube. Not
surprisingly, the continued conflict between the two doctrines has
sparked a new generation of scholarship,5 and litigation, as illustrated
2 Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the FirstAmendment GuaranteesofFree
Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970); Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free
Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of Expression, 67 CAL. L. REV. 283
(1979); see also Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the FirstAmendment, 70 CoLUM. L. REV. 983
(1970) (proposing that copyright laws accommodate first amendment freedom through the fair
use doctrine).
3 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
4 Id. at 560.
5 See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV.
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by the copyright infringement action against the author and publisher
of The Wind Done Gone, a work based upon Gone with the Wind but
told from the perspective of a slave 6 and the Supreme Court's
decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft upholding the constitutionality of
copyright term extension.7
This essay explores the relationship between copyright and free
speech by critically evaluating the proposition that conflicts between
the two can be eliminated because the Framers intended both to be
engines for free expression. My purpose is not to set forth a
comprehensive theory of copyright and free speech, 8 but instead is
more modest. This essay argues that while useful, reference to the
Framers' intent only goes so far in avoiding conflicts between
copyright and free speech, and when viewed outside of the facts
presented by Harper & Row and Eldred, reliance upon the Framers'
intent arguably highlights such conflicts. Moreover, this essay
suggests that efforts to minimize free speech concerns in copyright
cases by relying upon the Framers' intent9 beyond Harper& Row and
Eldred represent copyright Lochnernism.
Part I of this essay outlines the potential conflict between
copyright and the First Amendment. Part II discusses both judicial
and scholarly efforts to evaluate and reconcile the conflict. Particular
attention is paid to the Supreme Court's efforts to reconcile copyright
and free speech by referring to the intent of the Framers. Part III
evaluates and critiques efforts to avoid potential conflicts between
copyright and free speech based upon what the Framers intended.

891 (2002); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J.
283 (1996); L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791: An Essay Concerning the
Founders' View of the CopyrightPower Grantedto Congress in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of
the U.S. Constitution, 52 EMORY L. J. 909 (2003); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination:
Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1 (2002); Pamela Samuelson, Copyright and
Freedom of Expression in HistoricalPerspective, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 319 (2003); Rebecca
Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has in Common with
Anti-PornographyLaws, Campaign Finance Reform, and Telecommuncations Regulations, 42
B.C. L. REv. 1 (2000); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as
Goods: Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 665
(1992).
6 Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
7 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
8 For examples of such efforts see Baker, supra note 5; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating
Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001), and Tushnet, supra
note 5.
9 Of course, such charges are quite common in legal academia, and have already been
leveled in the debate over the future of copyright. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in
Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Management," 97 MICH. L. REV. 462
(1998); Paul M. Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright Term
Extension and IntellectualPropertyas ConstitutionalProperty, 112 YALE L.J. 2331 (2003).
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Given the limited scope of copyright in the eighteenth and even
nineteenth centuries, reference to the Framers' intent does little to
alleviate the First Amendment concerns raised by copyright as it
exists today. To the contrary, reference to the Framers' intent
highlights the growing First Amendment concerns generated by
copyright's expansion beyond its original, historical limits. Part III
ends by demonstrating that the Supreme Court's decisions in Harper
& Row and Eldred can be reconciled with an approach based upon the
Framers' copyright. Lastly, Part IV argues that broader efforts to
minimize free speech concerns raised by copyright based upon
definitional balancing represent a modern day version of Lochnerism.
Broader arguments based upon the proposition that copyright and free
speech are complementary with First Amendment concerns addressed
within copyright ignore or manipulate the baseline for evaluating the
relationship between copyright and free speech. This baseline
problem ultimately favors copyright, and allows judges to embed
what I have described elsewhere as the property idealists' position
within constitutional law. 10
I. VALUES IN CONFLICT?

Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the
power, "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors ...the exclusive Right to their
...Writings .....
Today, the Copyright Act grants the copyright
owner the exclusive right to reproduce, distribute, publicly perform
and display certain works, and the exclusive right to create new works
based upon her existing work 2 for the life of the author plus seventy
years. 13 And, the Act subjects violators to civil and criminal penalties,
including imprisonment. 14 Based upon these exclusive rights,
copyright owners may prevent others from delivering Martin Luther
King's "I Have a Dream" speech, 5 creating and distributing
documentaries,16 fans from creating alternative stories based upon
their favorite characters,1 7 prevent the press from publishing stories
"1

10Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Grokking Grokster, 2005 Wis. L. REv. 1217.
11 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.8.
12 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000 & Supp. IV 2001-05).
13 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000).
14 Id. §§ 502-504 (2000) (setting forth civil remedies); 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2000 & Supp.
IV 2001-05) (describing prison terms); 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (2000) (setting forth fines).
15 See Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 1999).
16 See DeNeen L. Brown & Hamil R. Harris, A Struggle for Rights: "Eye on the Prize"
Mired in Money Battle, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2005, at CO.
'1 See Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592, 1989 WL 206431 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 1989);
see also Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions:Copyright, FanFiction, and a New Common Law, 17
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incorporating copyrighted materials,' 8 and, with the assistance of
federal marshals, seize and destroy unauthorized works and the
machines used to reproduce those works.1 9 As Rebecca Tushnet
suggests, "[i]f the justification were anything other than copyright,
would be seen as a gaping hole at the heart of
these sweeping powers
20
free speech rights.",
The heart of the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of
speech is that the government may not dictate the content of a
speaker's message.21 Yet, this is exactly what copyright does.
Copyright's array of exclusive rights limit the freedom of subsequent
speakers to incorporate copyrighted expression as part of their speech.
As Edwin Baker observes:
Even if the original text were written by someone else, a
person may want to quote the poem privately to her beloved
or publicly at the protest rally, to give another person a copy
that she has made of a meaningful piece of writing, or to sing
the song or perform the play "owned" by another, or even to
write down or copy the expression for her own personal
use .

.

.

. In each case, .

constitutes speech
Amendment.22

from the

. the individual's expression

perspective

of the

First

Under copyright law, even Baker could establish a prima facie case of
copyright infringement for the preceding use of his expression in this
archetypal example of speech-a scholarly article. As such, copyright
restricts a speaker's freedom to determine the content of her message
by making it illegal to express oneself with copyrighted expression
without the authorization of the copyright owner.
The negative consequences for free speech are threefold. First,
copyright suppresses expression through threats of litigation and as a

Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 651, 664-78 (1997) (discussing fan fiction and fair use);
http://www.chillingeffects.org/fanfic (last visited April 16, 2007) (describing the legal issues
surrounding fan fictions).
18 17 U.S.C. § 502 (2000).
19 Id. § 503.
20 Tushnet, supra note 5, at 5.
21 See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (stating that at
"the heart of the First Amendment" is "the principle that each person should decide for himself
or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence"); see also
Baker, supra note 5, at 899 ("Freedom to speak presumptively means freedom to say absolutely
anything one wants without any limit on content.").
22 Baker, supra note 5, at 900 (footnotes omitted); see also Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This
Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J.

535 (2004).
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result of successful litigation. Second, copyright chills expression
because speakers will alter expression or refrain from legitimate
speech to steer clear of liability. Third, copyright increases the cost of
expression by requiring subsequent speakers to subsidize the
expression of copyright owners through the payment of licensing fees
and through the transaction costs incurred to obtain a copyright
owner's permission. Copyright, therefore, forces individuals to alter
the content of their speech, increases the cost of speech, and
suppresses speech, all of which are generally inconsistent with the
principles of the First Amendment.
These speech concerns are even more troublesome because the
burdens that copyright law imposes upon speech are more likely to
suppress the speech of poor speakers or speakers not engaged in
expression for commercial gain. Copyright's exclusive rights do not
distinguish between the unauthorized use of copyrighted expression
in a blockbuster motion picture from Walt Disney or as part of
scientific research; between a commercial pirate and a classroom
teacher; or between the New York Times and an amateur blogger. This
equal treatment, however, yields unequal results. By tying the use of
expression to a speaker's ability and willingness to pay for permission
or to mount a successful defense to infringement claims, copyright
represents a more significant obstacle for speakers with fewer
financial resources and those who do not seek or are unable to obtain
sufficient financial rewards to offset the costs of permission or
litigation. The end result is that the home movie producer, teacher,
and blogger are more likely to alter their expression or avoid speaking
altogether. Yet, from a First Amendment perspective these and
similarly situated speakers are entitled to the same, if not greater,
protection as Disney or the Times.
To be clear, the First Amendment does not require government to
provide would-be speakers access to copyrighted expression, but
rather limits the government's power to enact laws restricting such
uses. As such, freedom of speech does not require government to
limit a copyright owner's ability to use self-help to prevent copying or
to provide financial subsidies to enable speakers to use such
expression. Justice Ginsburg, therefore, mischaracterized the First
Amendment claim in Eldred as a "right to make other people's
speeches. 23 Instead, the First Amendment restricts government's
power to limit the use of expression. In Hohfeldian terms, this would
be the difference between rights and privileges.2 4 The First
23 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
24 Wesley Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
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Amendment does not create an affirmative right or claim to use
copyrighted expression backed by state power against copyright
owners. Instead, the First Amendment protects a speaker's privilege
to use expression without being liable for damages to copyright
owners and without copyright owners "being able to summon state
power to prevent those acts." 25 In this light, can copyright and free
speech be reconciled?
II. RECONCILIATION?
As noted earlier, the apparent conflict between copyright and free
speech did not receive judicial and scholarly attention until the late
twentieth century. And, the initial response could be considered quite
surprising. The first significant scholarly works on the subject denied
any conflict between copyright and free speech suggesting instead
that the two are complementary.26 According to this view, there is no
conflict because both copyright and the First Amendment promote
speech and the free marketplace of ideas. The First Amendment
promotes speech by restricting government interference in the
marketplace of ideas, and copyright promotes speech by restricting
individual acts that make the marketplace of ideas prone to market
failure. By creating economic incentives to speak and publish,
copyright establishes a robust market for expression independent
from the government. 27
To the extent that occasional conflicts arise, this complementary
approach argues that those conflicts are resolved through "definitional
balancing., 28 In other words, copyright's internal limits, especially
those found in the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use, eliminate
residual conflicts.29 Under the Copyright Act, copyright protects only
an author's expression (and original expression at that), 30 and does
not extend to the ideas, principles, and concepts in such works. 3'

Reasoning, 28 YALE. L.J. 16 (1913).
25 Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence From
Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 975, 986.
26See, e.g., Denicola, supra note 2; Goldstein, supra note 2; Nimmer, supra note 2.
27See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 5.
28 Nimmer, supra note 2, at 1184.
29Denicola, supra note 2, at 293-99; Nimmer, supra note 2, at 1189; see also William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325
(1989).
- 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) ("Copyright protection subsists ... in original works of
authorship ... ").
31 Id. § 102(b) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery .... ).
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Because copyright does not prohibit others from copying and using
the ideas 32 (or facts) 33 embodied within copyrighted expression,
Melvin Nimmer argues that copyright serves rather than frustrates
free speech. 34 The fact that copyright limits an individual's choice of
expression is of little significance. Following a marketplace of ideas
interpretation of the First Amendment based upon the work of
Alexander Meiklejohn, Nimmer argues that "[i]t is exposure to ideas,
and not to their particular expression, that is vital if self-governing
people are to make informed decisions. 35 Accordingly, whatever is
"lost through the copyright prohibition on reproduction of expression,
is far out-balanced by the public benefit
that accrues through
36
copyright encouragement of creativity.
Unwilling to dismiss the First Amendment value of adopting
someone else's expression, Robert Denicola adds that copyright's fair
37
use doctrine picked up where the idea/expression dichotomy left off.
According to Section 107 of the Copyright Act, the use of
copyrighted material for "purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
38
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.,
However, in order to determine whether "the use made of a work in
any particular case is a fair use," courts must consider at least four
factors: the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the
copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality used, and the effect
of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work. 39 Based upon these factors, a court may conclude that an
unauthorized use of copyrighted expression that falls within one of
the exclusive rights provided by the Act is, nevertheless,
non-infringing. Fair use is an affirmative defense with the defendant
bearing the burden of proof. Citing several decisions in which courts
found a defendant's unauthorized use to be fair, including quoting
magazine stories for an unauthorized biography of Howard Hughes
and the publication of parodies of popular song lyrics, Denicola
argues that the doctrine is capable of reconciling copyright law with
free speech even if the idea/expression dichotomy represents "the
32

Id.; see also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).

33 See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
34 Nimmer, supra note 2, at 1189-92.
35 Id. at 1191.

Id. at 1192.
Denicola, supra note 2, at 293 ("In some instances, however, the values inherent in the
rights of free speech and free press demand more than access to abstract ideas-they require the
use of the particular form of expression contained in a copyrighted work.").
38 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
36
37

39 Id.
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basic internal mechanism" to accommodate the two.4° According to
Denicola, because fair use focuses a court's attention on "the public
interest in the flow of information, it seeks to further many of the
same interests as the right of free speech. '41 Taking this line of
reasoning to its logical conclusion, some have argued that fair use
should be considered a constitutional doctrine whose scope is
determined by the First Amendment.42
Largely skeptical of definitional balancing, more recent scholars
have chosen to locate "copyright within the First Amendment
skein., 43 In large part, the skepticism is due to the inherent limitations
of definitional balancing. By addressing free speech concerns
internally within copyright, definitional balancing leaves free speech
at the mercy of copyright doctrine. When judges limit the
idea/expression dichotomy or fair use in favor of expanding
copyright's property interests, as they have done in recent years, they
limit free speech. Accordingly, scholars have argued that copyright's
restrictions upon speech must be subjected to the web of First
Amendment doctrine as content neutral restrictions of speech subject
to intermediate scrutiny, 44 evaluated consistently with other speech
promoting regulations that restrict some speech in order to promote
speech overall,45 or subject to a full protection theory of the First
Amendment invalidating certain aspects of copyright law such as its
protection of derivative works46 or its application to individual
not-for-profit uses of expression.4 7 While I agree with many of the
arguments raised by these scholars, a full discussion of these
approaches is beyond the scope of this essay. Moreover, courts,
especially the Supreme Court, have yet to adopt them.
In two cases, the Supreme Court refused to subject copyright to
any First Amendment scrutiny. In so doing, the Court relied upon a
modified version of the complementary approach and definitional
balancing. In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,
40 Denicola, supra note 2, at 293.
41 Id. at297.
42 Harry N. Rosenfield, The ConstitutionalDimensions of "FairUse" in Copyright Law,
50 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 790, 796-98 (1975). Denicola rejected such an approach arguing
instead for the recognition of a first amendment privilege based upon necessity and the public
interest. Denicola, supra note 2, at 306-15.
43Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54
STAN. L. REv. 1 (2001).

44Id.

45Tushnet, supra note 5, at 4-5.
4 See generally Rubenfeld, supra note 5 (arguing that the derivative work right violates a
freedom of imagination).
47See Baker, supra note 5 (applying a full protection theory based upon the speech and
press clauses).
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the Supreme Court upheld a trial court ruling that the publication of
quotations from President Ford's yet-to-be published memoirs in a
magazine story discussing his decision to pardon President Nixon
constituted copyright infringement.4 8 The Nation argued that the
quoting of approximately three hundred words from President Ford's
manuscript should be considered fair use or protected by the First
Amendment because the publication of a story addressing an
historical event based upon the President's own account was
newsworthy.4 9 In rejecting the Nation's contentions, Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion emphasized that:
In our haste to disseminate news, it should not be forgotten
that the Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of
free expression. By establishing a marketable right to the use
of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic
incentive to create and disseminate ideas.5 °
The Court went on to note that copyright already embodied First
Amendment protections, "in the Copyright Act's distinction between
copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the
latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use
....
Concluding that the Nation's use was not a fair use, the Court
rejected the Nation's argument that the First Amendment required a
different rule or result. 52 Under Harper & Row, not only is there no
conflict between copyright and free speech as Nimmer and others
suggest, but according to the Court, this distinction was what the
Framers intended.
More recently, the Supreme Court again rejected efforts to subject
copyright to First Amendment scrutiny. In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the
Court rejected a constitutional challenge to Congress's decision to
extend the term of copyright protection by an additional twenty years
under the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA).5 3 Among other
things, petitioners argued that the CTEA represented a content-neutral
regulation of speech that could not satisfy heightened judicial
scrutiny.54 In rejecting the First Amendment argument, the Court
refused to apply heightened scrutiny to copyright which it
characterized as incorporating "its own speech-protective purposes
48

471 U.S. 539, 543-45 (1985).

49 Id.

50 Id. at 558.

51 Id. at 560.
52

Id.

53 537 U.S. 186, 193-95 (2003).
5

Id. at 218-19.
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and safeguards. 55 Once again, copyright's purpose of promoting
speech and its "built-in First Amendment accommodations" 56-the
idea/expression dichotomy and fair use-insulated the law from First
Amendment scrutiny. Following Harper & Row, Justice Ginsburg's
majority opinion once again justified this method of reconciling
copyright and free speech by relying upon the intent of the Framers.
According to Justice Ginsburg, "The Copyright Clause and First
Amendment were adopted close in time. This proximity indicates
that, in the Framers' view, copyright's limited monopolies are
compatible with free speech principles. 57
In upholding the CTEA, the Court, nonetheless, rejected the D.C.
Circuit's statement that copyrights are "categorically immune from
challenges under the First Amendment., 58 Instead, Justice Ginsburg
concluded that copyright's internal limits "are generally adequate" to
address free speech concerns, "[b]ut when, as in this case, Congress
has not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection, further
First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary. 5 9 Consequently, the
Supreme Court's opinion in Eldred leaves open the possibility that
First Amendment scrutiny may be appropriate under other
circumstances. What changes to the "traditional contours of copyright
protection" will trigger further First Amendment scrutiny, however,
remains to be seen.
I. THE FRAMERS
Reconciling copyright and free speech by referring to the intent of
the Framers of the Constitution is an intriguing prospect. Reference to
the Framers and first principles are useful starting points in any legal
analysis. However, to the extent that we can determine what the
Framers intended, I do not mean to suggest that judges and society are
bound by that intent. Rather, when our current understanding of the
Constitution differs from the Framers, departures from what the
Framers' intended should be acknowledged and justified. With
respect to the proper relationship between copyright and free speech,
and how conflicts between the two should be reconciled, the Supreme
Court repeatedly refers to the Framers' intent. Yet, to borrow from

Inigo Montoya and The PrincessBride, "I do not think [the Framers'
intent] means what you think it means., 60 Given the limited scope of
55

Id. at 219.

Id.
57 Id.
58Id. at 221 (quoting Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (2001)).
59 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221.
56

60 THE PRINCESS BRIDE (Twentieth Century Fox 1987).
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copyright in the eighteenth and even nineteenth centuries, reference to
the Framers' intent does little to alleviate the First Amendment
concerns raised by copyright as it exists today. To the contrary,
reference to the Framers' intent highlights the genuine First
Amendment concerns generated by copyright's expansion beyond its
original limits and perhaps beyond its "traditional contours."
A. The Framers' Intent
Historically, there is very little evidence regarding the Framers'
intent in this area. While we know a little about what the Framers
thought about copyright, why it was adopted and that the Act was
patterned after the English Statute of Anne,61 there is no evidence
revealing what they thought about the relationship between copyright
and free speech or how to resolve conflicts between the two. Instead,
we are left with the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Harper
& Row and Eldred. We must infer the Framers' intent based upon
their actions. And, the major piece of evidence from which we can
infer intent is the fact that the First Congress of the United States
adopted both the first Copyright Act and the First Amendment.
There are several possible inferences that may be drawn from this
fact. First, one may infer, as has the Supreme Court, that the Framers
believed that copyright was consistent with free speech. Second, the
Framers may not have anticipated nor been aware of any conflicts.
Third, the Framers may have recognized an actual or potential
conflict, and chose to leave the resolution for another day (or to
someone else). Only the first inference supports the position that
copyright's restrictions upon expression are by definition consistent
with the First Amendment. For the purposes of this discussion, this
essay assumes that the Framers considered copyright to be consistent
with free speech because, by all accounts, the First Amendment was a
direct response to the evils of censorship in England made possible by
copyright's historical antecedents. 62 As such, it is unlikely that the
61 See BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW (1967);
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX
(1994); LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1968); Patterson &

Joyce, supra note 5; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (discussing copyright in the context of
federal powers); NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY
JAMES MADISON (Ohio Univ. Press 1984) (recording founders' debates concerning copyright in
the broader debates concerning the future of the U.S. Constitution from James Madison's
perspective); THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 VOL. 1n(Max Farrand, ed.,

1911) (providing the official report of the Constitutional Convention, including discussions on
copyright law); EDWARD SAMUELS, THE ILLUSTRATED STORY OF COPYRIGHT (2000) (exploring
the evolution of copyright law in the U.S.).
62 See Goldstein, supra note 2, at 983; Patterson & Joyce, supra note 5, at 948. In first
amendment doctrine this is traced to John Milton's and Blackstone's critique of the prior
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Framers would enable the very same evils through copyright that they
were trying to prevent with the First Amendment. 63 Even this
assumption, however, only provides a partial solution.
Reliance upon the Framers' intent is an incomplete solution to the
copyright and free speech problem because the Framers' copyright
was extremely limited and did little to threaten free speech, even as
the First Amendment is interpreted today. Following its English
predecessor, the Copyright Act of 1790 was entitled "An act for the
encouragement of learning" and granted copyright owners the
exclusive right to "print, reprint, publish or vend" their works for an
64
initial term of fourteen years renewable for another fourteen years.
It applied to books, maps, and charts, and required a copyright owner
to comply with various formalities, including registering and
depositing the work to obtain copyright protection. 65 Limited to the
right to "print, reprint, publish, or vend," the Act prohibited only a
single species of uses: selling copies of the work in competition with
the copyright owner.66 This meant that subsequent authors and
speakers were free to use copyrighted expression as their own in all
other respects. This was true even when that expression "merely"
abridged, translated, or performed the original.67 Moreover, the right

to "print, reprint, publish or vend" was never applied to
noncommercial copying including the personal copying of an entire
work by hand.68
Given the extremely limited scope of the Framers' copyright, it is
unlikely that its restrictions in 1790 would trouble the First

restraints upon speech imposed by the Licensing Acts. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota ex rel.
Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); David A. Anderson, The Originsof the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L.
REv. 455 (1983).
63 See Patterson & Joyce, supra note 5, at 942-45.
64 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
65 Id.

66 See PATrERSON, supra note 61, at 215 (arguing that copyright was originally designed
to protect an "exclusive right to reproduce the work for sale"); Baker, supra note 5, at 901; cf
BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 9 (1967) (noting that the draftsman
of virtually identical language in the Statute of Anne were "thinking as a printer would-of a
book as a physical entity; of rights in it and offenses against it as related to 'printing and
reprinting' the thing itself; of punishment for illicit reprinting as involving in the first instance
destruction of the very duplicating book.").
67 See Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13514); Kaplan, supra
note 66, at 9-12.
68 Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1350 (Ct. Cl. 1973)
(discussing Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (originally enacted as Act of May 31,
1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124)), affyd 420 U.S. 376 (1975); see also L. RAY PATrERSON & STANLEY
W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT (1991); Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for
the Information Age, 75 OR. L. REv. 19, 40-43 (1996); Pamela Samuelson, Copyright and
Freedom of Expression in HistoricalPerspective, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 319, 326 (2003).
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Amendment, even as it is interpreted today. While the First
Amendment guarantees individuals the freedom to determine the
content of their expression, it does not guarantee a right to profit from
expression. As Professor Baker argues, "[f]reedom of speech gives a
person a right to say what she wants. It does not give the person a
right to charge a price for the opportunity to hear or receive her
speech.,69 Moreover, to the extent that the Framers' copyright
suppressed expression, courts could readily conclude that such a
narrowly defined right would withstand heightened First Amendment
scrutiny. The Framers' copyright promoted speech by creating an
independent market for expression, an important if not compelling
governmental interest. And, limited to the commercial right to sell
copies, the Framers' copyright was narrowly tailored, if not the least
restrictive means, to achieve that objective. This narrow tailoring is
especially noteworthy when one considers that in addition to the
limited nature of the right, the Copyright Act of 1790 required authors
to register the copyrighted work, affix copyright notices to the work,
and deposit a copy of the work with what would become the Library
of Congress, or lose copyright protection. Consequently, the idea that
copyright and free speech did not conflict from the Framers'
perspective is quite convincing. In fact, one can argue that copyright
and the First Amendment were "cut from the same bolt of English
cloth," and "recognized and respected the same delicate balance of
interests necessary to maintain and enhance the public domain
through the vigorous encouragement of a free press., 70 However,
today's copyright bears little resemblance to the Framers' copyright.
In marked contrast with the Framers' copyright, today's copyright
restricts virtually all of the expression and uses of copyrighted works
permitted by the Framers. Today, copyright prohibits the
abridgement, translation, and public performance of copyrighted
works without the copyright owner's permission. 71 Both the
reproduction right and derivative work right prohibit the creation of
new works that do not literally copy a copyright work, but are
"substantially similar '72 or based upon the original work.7 3 And,
Baker, supra note 5, at 903.
Patterson & Joyce, supra note 5, at 950.
71 17 U.S.C. § 106(2), (4) (2000) (providing copyright owners with the exclusive right to
create derivative works and to publicly perform those works); see also id. § 101 ("A 'derivative
work' is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical
arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art
reproduction, abridgement, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast,
transformed, or adapted.").
72 See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) ("But we do
not doubt that two plays may correspond in plot closely enough for infringement.").
69
70
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copyright has been interpreted to apply to personal uses as well.74
Despite the idea/expression dichotomy, courts have relied upon
copyright to protect fictional characters,75 an artist's style,76
"expressive" facts,77 and the "look and feel" of copyrighted works.78
Moreover, courts have largely limited fair use to circumstances in
which an opportunity to obtain a license is not readily available either
because of high transaction costs or because copyright owners are not
likely to license such uses, as in the case of a negative review or
scathing parody, even when the expression is for the purposes of the
news,7 9 education, ° and scientific research. 8'
What the Framers intended, therefore, has only limited
applicability. Arguments relying upon the Framers' intent to reconcile
copyright and free speech rest on fundamentally shaky ground if they
attempt to extend this line of reasoning beyond the restrictions
established in 1790. It is one thing to suggest that the Framers
considered copyright as they defined it to be consistent with the First
Amendment. It is quite another to suggest that the Framers would
consider copyright as it has evolved to be consistent with the First
Amendment. The former is supported by the historical record. The
latter is purely speculative. In fact, the Framers' intent may be relied
upon to reach the opposite conclusion. Because copyright has
expanded far beyond the Framers' copyright, reliance upon the
Framers' intent may suggest a need for greater First Amendment
scrutiny.
If one believes that the Framers' copyright represented a delicate
balancing between copyright and free speech, then copyright's
subsequent expansion may have upset that delicate balance. In other

73 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2000); see also id. § 101 (defining derivative works).
74 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2774

(2005) (noting that users of a file sharing network could be considered direct copyright
infringers); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). But see,
Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Consumers and Creative Destruction: Fair Use Beyond Market
Failure, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 539 (2003) (arguing that fair use is justified when consumers
of work copy it).
75 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 900 F. Supp.
1287 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (confirming the valid copyright of MGM's James Bond character).
76 See Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
77 See Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998).
78 Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 1970) (holding
that all the elements of a greeting card, including textual arrangement and artwork, should be
considered as a whole when determining copyrightability).
79 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
80 See Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1388 (6th
Cir. 1996); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
S See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 929 (2d Cir. 1994).
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words, if the Copyright Act of 1790 was a carefully tailored response
based upon the Framers' understanding of England's experience
prompting the adoption of the First Amendment, then one may infer
that expansions beyond the public, commercial right to "print, reprint,
publish or vend" are suspect. This does not mean that subsequent
expansions of copyright necessarily violate the First Amendment. To
reach that conclusion, the Framers' copyright would have to represent
their intent to exercise the outermost limits of congressional power.
More likely, the Framers left room for copyright to expand
consistently with the First Amendment. Nonetheless, it does suggest a
significantly greater role for the First Amendment. And, the Framers'
copyright provides the most logical starting point for evaluating
whether Congress has expanded copyright beyond its "traditional
contours" as suggested in Eldred.
B. The Framers' Copyright
Unless one believes that copyright (and the Constitution) should
remain frozen in time, defining copyright's traditional contours by
reference to the Framers' copyright readily lends itself to
distinguishing between the expansion of copyright to protect new
forms of expression versus the imposition of new limits upon
expression. For example, one may argue that copyright has not
expanded beyond its traditional contours as it has been applied to
sound recordings, photography, motion pictures, broadcasts, and
digital works. While copyright protection for these new forms of
expression is literally an expansion beyond the Framers' copyright,
this expansion does little to change the balance between copyright
and free speech. As illustrated by Table 1 and Table 2, the law merely
applies copyright's existing restrictions upon expression to new
categories of works similar to the writings protected by the Framers.
To be sure more speech is suppressed, however, standing alone, the
suppression of speech accompanying the protection of new works, is
no different in kind to what the Framers considered acceptable, and
the Framers' balance is maintained.
Table 1.
© Books

Free Speech
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Table 2.
© Books

Free Speech

© Photos

Free Speech

In contrast, changes in copyright that impose new limits upon
expression are not as easily reconciled. The creation of new rights or
the expansion of existing rights alter the balance between copyright
and free speech struck by the Framers. Consider copyright's current
protection of derivative works. By granting copyright owners the
right to control derivative works, copyright restricts a tremendous
range of expression previously unrestricted by the Framers. As
illustrated by Table 3 and Table 4, the addition of the derivative work
right to the exclusive rights created by copyright changes the
relationship between copyright and free speech. While Congress's
decision to grant authors the exclusive right to derivative works may
be a wise policy choice, and may be consistent with the Constitution,
by altering the original balance between copyright and free speech,
should be subject to judicial review under the
Congress's decision
82
Amendment.
First
Table 3.
Right to Vend

Free Speech

Table 4.
Right to Vend &
Derivative Works

Free Speech
F

The Supreme Court's decisions in both Harper & Row and Eldred
are arguably consistent with evaluating First Amendment claims by
reference to the Framers' copyright. Neither case represented a
situation in which Congress or the courts expanded copyright by
recognizing limitations of expression unknown to the Framers.
Ultimately, Harper & Row turned upon an author's common law right
8 For excellent discussions on how to approach that review see Baker, supra note 5;
Netanel, supra note 5, and Tushnet, supra note 5.
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to determine when and how to publish one's manuscript; a right
predating copyright and unaltered by the Framers' adoption of
statutory copyright.83 Likewise, Eldred addressed Congress's decision
to extend the length of copyright protection and not the substantive
balance between copyright and free speech. While increasing the term
of copyright protection has consequences for speech by limiting the
amount of expression that will become part of the public domain,
term extension is not a new form of restriction. Rather, term extension
maintains copyright's existin g restrictions upon expression, albeit,
over a longer period of time!° As such, both cases can be reconciled
with the Framers' copyright as a baseline for determining when
additional First Amendment scrutiny is called for in copyright
disputes. The same, however, cannot be said for the derivative work
right, public performance right, or copyright's application to
noncommercial expression and copying. Nonetheless, it remains to be
seen whether the Supreme Court will rely upon the Framers'
copyright to define copyright's traditional contours.
TV. DEFINITIONAL BALANCING AS COPYRIGHT LOCHNERISM
While the Supreme Court's decisions in Harper& Row and Eldred
are arguably consistent with the Framers' intent, reliance upon
definitional balancing, rather than the Framers' copyright, to establish
the relationship between copyright and the First Amendment
represents a modem day version of Lochnerism.85 This charge is
leveled for two reasons. First, by rejecting the need for additional
constitutional scrutiny when Congress expands copyright beyond the
Framers' copyright, definitional balancing ignores or manipulates the
baseline for evaluating the relationship between copyright and free
speech. Second, by ignoring the baseline problem, definitional
balancing ultimately allows judges to embed their own disputed
vision of property within constitutional law at the First Amendment's
expense. This copyright Lochnerism effectively transforms the
constitutional relationship between copyright and the First
Amendment from one in which the Constitution defines the limits of

83

Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 550-52.

84 I do not mean to minimize the Constitutional concerns raised by term extensions.

However, I do agree with the Court that those questions are best addressed under the "limited
Times" provision of Article I, Section 8, Clause 8. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,
199-208 (2003).
85 This discussion builds and expands upon an essay I presented as part of a symposium
on First Amendment Lochnerism. See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Copyright Lochnerism, 33 N.
KY. L. REv. 401 (2006).
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copyright to one in which copyright defines the limits of the
Constitution.
The work of Paul Schwartz and William Treanor illustrates the
problems associated with addressing First Amendment concerns in
copyright cases through definitional balancing.86 Schwartz and
Treanor argue that the Supreme Court in Eldred adopted the most
deferential standard of review for constitutional questions, and that
this standard of review should be applied in all intellectual property
cases. 87 According to the authors, arguments in favor of greater
judicial scrutiny suffer from the same flaws in logic and the same
infirmities as Lochner v. New York88 and its progeny.89 Specifically,
they argue that heightened judicial review would elevate a particular
economic policy not grounded in either the text of the Constitution or
its original understanding to constitutional status and prevent
legislatures from innovating in response to economic change. 90 By
rejecting the so-called IP restrictor's arguments in Eldred, the
Supreme Court supposedly avoided creating a Lochner for the third
millennium. 9 1 In defense of Eldred, Schwartz and Treanor argue that
courts should interpret the Constitution holistically and apply
heightened scrutiny only under circumstances in which the political
process cannot be relied upon to protect fundamental rights or
discrete and insular minorities.9 2 Assuming that this conclusion is
appropriate with regard to the Copyright Term Extension Act's
retroactive extension of the copyright term, the argument that such
deference should extend to all intellectual property questions is
flawed because it fundamentally misconceives the problem and
represents a form of Lochnerism of its own.
A. What Problem?
First, Schwartz and Treanor's critique of heightened review in
copyright cases entirely ignores the conflict between copyright and
the First Amendment. For example, they describe the classic critique
of Lochner as "the Court should not second-guess legislative
judgments and, in the absence of clear constitutional restrictions, it
should let majorities govern. 93 As such, heightened judicial review is
86 See Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 9.

87 Id. at 2334.
88 198 U.S. 45 (1905),
89 Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 9, at 2390-96.

90Id. at 2393.
91 Id. at 2395.
92 Id. at 2406-07.
93 Id. at 2409.
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inappropriate unless there is an express constitutional limitation such
as those embodied in the Bill of Rights or one that is necessary
to ensure the proper functioning of the democratic process. The
latter
proposition
is
based
upon
John
Hart
Ely's
representation-reinforcement theory of constitutional interpretation.94
According to Schwartz and Treanor, copyright is no different than
other forms of property, and consistent with economic regulation in
general, courts should defer to Congress. 95 While they are concerned
with preserving a robust "public domain," protection of the public
domain is left to fair use and more creative mechanisms for the
licensing of copyrights.9 6
Constitutional
challenges
to
copyright, however,
are
fundamentally different than the economic regulations challenged in
Lochner. This is not a situation in which courts are asked to define the
vague contours of substantive due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment, but rather to apply an express constitutional limitation
embodied in the Bill of Rights. Copyright restricts expression and
implicates the First Amendment. Presumably, the authors would
agree that freedom of speech is a fundamental right, and that the First
Amendment is a clear constitutional restriction upon democratic
majorities justifying heightened scrutiny even under a representationreinforcing theory of constitutional interpretation. Yet, because of
definitional balancing, they ignore entirely copyright's restrictions
upon speech, and make no effort to explain why the First Amendment
does not apply in copyright cases. Instead, they simply state that
"while the grant (or denial or limitation) of copyright protection has
consequences for speech, the petitioners' argument in Eldred
concerning the Copyright Clause is not one that implicates free
speech concerns." 97 In Schwartz and Treanor's defense, this omission
reflects a fundamental flaw inherent in definitional balancing.
B. Of Baselines and Economic Theories
Moreover, definitional balancing represents a form of copyright
Lochnerism. While there is a rich body of literature discussing and
criticizing the Supreme Court's Lochner era jurisprudence, this essay
focuses upon two specific criticisms of Lochner. The first criticizes
94 Id. at 2401.

95 Id. at 2334.
96 Id. at 2409.
97 Id. at 2410. As should be clear from my earlier discussion, to the extent that Schwartz
and Treanor's argument is limited to the length of copyright's protection, I am inclined to agree
with their analysis. My disagreement stems from their effort to expand this argument and apply
it to copyright in general.
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Lochner for failing to recognize the appropriate baseline for analyzing
economic regulations under the Fourteenth Amendment. The second,
related criticism, is represented by Justice Holmes's charge that the
Supreme Court imported a disputed economic policy into the
Constitution, and according to Holmes, the Constitution "does not
enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics. 98 As discussed below,
these two criticisms are interrelated. The baseline problem is the
means by which judges embed disputed economic policies within the
Constitution.
One of the principal criticisms of Lochner is provided by Cass
Sunstein, who argues that Lochner's fundamental flaw was to rely
upon common law entitlements as a natural baseline for constitutional
analysis. 99 When evaluating the constitutionality of economic
regulations, the Supreme Court in the Lochner era based its decision
upon status quo neutrality or, in his words, "a particular conception of
neutrality, one based on existing distributions of wealth and
entitlements."'' l 0 The maximum hour and wage laws at issue in the
Lochner era cases were considered unconstitutional because they
altered existing economic rights, which were seen as natural. 10 1 In
other words, the Lochner era decisions adopted a one-sided approach
when defining state power in the economic realm, and this approach
was fundamentally flawed because it refused to recognize the
appropriate analytical baseline. The subsequent rejection of Lochner,
therefore, represents the rejection of status quo neutrality and the
corresponding recognition that existing property and economic rights
are themselves created and maintained by the power of the state and
10 2
may, therefore, be modified and reallocated by the state.
Definitional balancing suffers from a similar baseline problem.
Like Lochner and economic substantive due process before it,
definitional balancing relies upon its own version of status quo
neutrality. Rather than viewing changes to the status quo as
generating
constitutional
concerns,
definitional
balancing
incorporates changes to copyright into the status quo to eliminate
such concerns. This status quo, however, is not fixed. Definitional
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
99 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 45 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein,
Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873 (1987). But see David E. Bernstein, Lochner's
Legacy's Legacy, 82 'Ex. L. REV. 1 (2003) (criticizing Sunstein's analysis).
t0oSuNsTEw, supra note 99, at 45.
to, See id. at 40; HOWARD GiLLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND
98

DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 132-33 (1993).

102SUNSTEIN, supra note 99, at 58 ("We must lay hold of the fact that economic laws are
not made by nature. They are made by human beings." (quoting 2 The Public Papers and
Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt 5 (1938))).
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balancing does not examine the relationship between copyright and
free speech at some fixed point in time to determine whether
copyright was consistent with the First Amendment then and remains
consistent now, as would an approach based upon the Framers'
copyright. Instead, definitional balancing concludes that copyright
and free speech are always consistent, even when changes within
copyright impose greater restrictions upon expression. The current
state of copyright is the only relevant state, and this is true even when,
for example, the judges themselves are establishing the current state
of copyright in the cases before them by denying fair use. As such,
definitional balancing treats changes to copyright as First Amendment
neutral even when those changes alter the relationship between
copyright and free speech. If Lochner arbitrarily relied upon the
common law as its baseline, definitional balancing arbitrarily relies
upon copyright as it exists (even when it is in the process of being
changed) as the baseline. Unlike the common law, the baseline
established by definitional balancing is dynamic. The fact that
congressional and judicial decisions alter the baseline between
copyright and the First Amendment is either not recognized or
ignored. This is illustrated by the following tables, where C1 and C2
represent changes to copyright.
Table 5.

Copyright

Free Speech
C1
Table 6.

Copyright
Cl

Free Speech
C2

Despite clear changes in the relationship between copyright and free
speech illustrated by the two tables, definitional balancing treats the
two as equivalent under the First Amendment even though the
baseline changes from C1 to C2. Yet, the change in relationship is
precisely why First Amendment scrutiny is demanded.
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Consider Table 7. Assuming that the scope of copyright under the
Act of 1790, represented by Cl, did not represent what the Framers'
considered the full extent of congressional power, we may assume
that there is room for copyright to expand consistently with the First
Amendment. This is represented by the shaded area bounded by C1
and C2.
Table 7.

Framers ©

Free Speech
C1

C2

Nevertheless, a determination that copyright's expansion is within the
permissible zone of expansion cannot be made without reference to
the First Amendment. If the problem with Lochner was judicial
reliance upon the common law as a baseline for evaluating the
constitutionality of subsequent economic regulation, copyright
Lochnerism occurs when copyright's constitutionality under the First
Amendment is assumed without regard to subsequent changes within
copyright that alter the relationship between the two." 3
Second, judicial reliance upon definitional balancing suffers from
another fatal Lochner flaw. By broadening the complementary
approach beyond the historical limits recognized by the Framers,
definitional balancing allows judges to import a disputed economic
theory and vision of property into the Constitution. In his famous
dissent in Lochner, Justice Holmes criticized the majority's decision
to strike down the challenged legislation on the basis that the Court
was embedding a policy of laissez faire economics into the
Constitution. °4 According to Holmes:
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large
part of the country does not entertain, If it were a question
whether I agreed with that theory, I should desire to study it
further and long before making up my mind. But I do not
conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly believe that
my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the
right of a majority to embody their opinions in law .... The
103
Reliance upon the Framers' copyright avoids this problem by establishing a fixed
baseline.
l04 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Fourteenth Amendment
does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's
10 5
Social Statics.
In other words, because the Constitution was silent on the question,
the Supreme Court's decision impermissibly limited the people's
right to adopt legislation based upon a different economic theory. By
denying any role for the First Amendment, definitional balancing
allows judges to entrench their own disputed economic theory into the
Constitution.
We are currently engaged in a global debate over copyright and its
expansion. Some prominent examples of this debate include the
disagreements over fair use sparked by Internet search engine
technology, 1°6 Eldred and the length of copyright protection, file
sharing, 10 7 and the scope of secondary liability for companies that
18
provide computer and telecommunications products and services. 0
The two sides in this debate are represented by what I have described
as "property pragmatists" and "property idealists."' 10 9 The property
pragmatist takes the position that property rules, like those created by
copyright law, serve specific policy goals. When factual
circumstances change because of shifting markets or new technology,
the property pragmatist accepts that existing property rules may no
longer fit the new circumstances, and may require modification or
even abandonment. In other words, the property pragmatist
acknowledges that the questions, "Should file sharing be prohibited?"
and, "If so, what standard for secondary liability should be imposed
upon the providers of goods and services that facilitate file sharing?,"
may require the resolution of complicated empirical and policy
questions concerning the goals of copyright and how those goals are
best achieved. For the pragmatist, property rights are not absolute,
and recognizing a property right or expanding such exclusive rights
may not be the best method for achieving the law's ultimate purpose.
Instead, copyright's goal of stimulating the creation and
105Id.

o6See Edward Wyatt, Writers Sue Google, Accusing It of Copyright Violation, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2005, at C3.
1°TSee A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); see also
Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New
Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (2002) (discussing the issue of
copyright protection for digital works).
108See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005); see
also Ku, supra note 10 (discussing the role courts should play in the debate over secondary
liability under copyright law).
109
See Daniel A. Farber, Conflicting Visions and Contested Baselines: Intellectual
Property and Free Speech in the "Digital Millennium," 89 MINN. L. REv. 1318 (2005)
(discussing the difference between the Jeffersonian and the Hamiltonian philosophies of
government regulation and applying those philosophies to intelectual property rights).
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dissemination of creative works may be better served by allowing
certain unauthorized uses to go uncompensated or by compensating
authors under a liability regime that might result in compulsory
licensing or public funding. Because the pragmatist does not assume
that property rights are always the best solution, it should come as no
surprise that the pragmatist questions whether courts may
competently and legitimately make such decisions.
In contrast, the property idealist assumes that absolute property
rights are always the best solution. Like the pragmatist, the property
idealist recognizes that existing property rules may need to be
modified to address changed circumstances. However, property rights
remain the answer. Those advocating this position with respect to
copyright proceed under the assumption that "the most efficient legal
regime, measured by its success at inducing the creation of digital
works and increasing consumers' access to information, is that which
permits copyright owners to maximize control over the terms and
conditions of use of their digital property."" 0 According to this
position, if technology or changing market conditions create new
opportunities, property rights should be clarified in favor of granting
control over those opportunities to copyright owners. "Unlike
property pragmatists, idealists do not question judicial resolution of
these questions. To the contrary, property idealists argue that courts
are well suited for making such decisions."''
Definitional balancing furthers the property idealist agenda by
minimizing if not eliminating First Amendment limits upon the
expansion of copyright. Definitional balancing achieves this result in
several significant ways. First, it obscures First Amendment concerns
in copyright cases by shifting the focus of such decisions away from
the relationship between copyright and the First Amendment to
copyright exclusively. If copyright internally accommodates freedom
of speech, as suggested by definitional balancing, there is no need for
courts to conduct an independent First Amendment analysis or for
judges to consider values outside of copyright. As Diane Zimmerman
observes:
What seems to have happened in the course of this conflict is
that an ever-expanding array of new or reconstructed property
theories is cannibalizing speech values at the margin. In large
part, this has occurred not because speech claims are
inherently weaker than property claims, but because courts
" 0 Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights
Management," 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 464 (1998).
' Ku, supra note 10, at 1230-32.
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fail to think critically about the justifications for, functions of,
and limitations
on property rules in the sensitive arena of
12
speech.
With its dynamic baseline, definitional balancing makes it possible
for judges to "fail to think critically" because the approach assumes
that any First Amendment problems that might exist are already
addressed by copyright. Courts, therefore, tend to or are able to focus
exclusively on interpreting copyright and copyright doctrine without
considering how their decisions impact freedom of speech or
recognizing their own role in the process.
One of Justice Holmes' famous copyright decisions illustrates the
myopia brought on by definitional balancing. In Bleistein v
Donaldson Lithographing Co., Justice Holmes penned what is known
in copyright law as the non-discrimination principle. 3 Bleistein
addressed the unauthorized copying of illustrations that appeared on a
poster advertising circus acts. The Circuit Court agreed with the
defendant that because the illustrations were part of an advertisement,
they were not protected by copyright because at the time, the
Copyright Act of 1874 stated that it, "applied only to pictorial
illustrations or works connected with the fine arts."' 1 4 The Supreme
Court reversed on the basis that illustrations used in advertisements
could still be considered fine arts. According to Justice Holmes,
"works are not the less connected with the fine arts because their
pictorial quality attracts the crowd and therefore gives them a real
use-if use means to increase trade and to help make money. A
picture is none the less a picture and none the less a subject of
copyright. . . .,, ' Any other conclusion would impermissibly inject
the aesthetic judgments and biases of judges into copyright law, and:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only
to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth
of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most
obvious limits. At the one extreme, some works of genius
would be sure to miss appreciation. Their novelty would
make them repulsive until the public had learned the new
language in which their author spoke. It may be more than
doubted, for instance, whether the etchings of Goya or the
paintings of Manet, would have been sure of protection when
Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 667.
"3 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903)
114Id. at 250 (quoting 18 Stat. L. 78, 79, chap. 301, § 3, U.S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3412).
12

"'

Id. at 250.
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seen for the first time. At the other end, copyright would be
denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated
than a judge. Yet if they command the interest of any public,
they have a commercial value-it would be bold to say that
they have not an aesthetic and educational value-and
the
6
taste of any public is not to be treated with contempt."
Internally, Holmes' logic is quite convincing, which is one of the
reasons why it has withstood the test of time. As a policy matter, it is
entirely appropriate to conclude that copyright law should apply to all
illustrations without regard to their subjective artistic or aesthetic
value. Likewise, it would be wholly arbitrary to allow copyright
17
protection to turn about the individual preferences of judges.
Nonetheless, interpreting copyright to include illustrations produced
for advertising necessarily reduces the opportunities for expression
available to others which may or may not run afoul of the First
Amendment. Yet, Holmes never considered or questioned whether his
interpretation of copyright raised First Amendment concerns, and
under definitional balancing such considerations were unnecessary.
In contrast, when presented with separation of powers questions,
Justice Holmes was acutely aware of the limits imposed by the
Constitution and upon judges to expand property rights. In
White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., Justice Holmes
agreed with the majority that whether copyright should be applied to
piano rolls was a decision for Congress and not the Court even though
he believed that it was logically consistent to extend copyright
protection under the circumstances'18 Similarly, in International
News Service v. Associated Press, Justice Holmes rejected the idea
that the Supreme Court could recognize a quasi-property right in
news between competing news services. According to Holmes:
Property, a creation of law, does not arise from value,
although exchangeable .... Property depends upon exclusion
by law from interference, and a person is not excluded from
using any combination of words merely because some one

116Id.

U7 It is equally plausible that Congress' reference to "fine arts" was not intended to

discriminate between high value versus low value works, but instead, reflected Congress
judgment that so called fine arts illustrations are more likely to be under-produced because of
unauthorized copying than illustrations created for advertising.
118209 U.S. 1, 19-20 (Holmes, J., concurring specially).
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has used it before, even if it took labor and genius to make
it.119

And, if a property right were to be recognized under the
circumstances, the decision would have to come from the
Legislature.120 While one might argue that Justice Holmes's
differential treatment of First Amendment and separation of powers
concerns was based upon a personal preference for separation of
powers questions or a still-developing view of free speech, it is just as
likely that Holmes, and so many other judges after him, simply failed
to appreciate the free speech concerns in copyright cases. By
obscuring the relationship between copyright and free speech,
definitional balancing hides the problem even from our leading
jurists.
Furthermore, definitional balancing undercuts the First
Amendment as a means for questioning the legitimacy of subjecting
copyright cases to heightened judicial scrutiny. If copyright and free
speech are already balanced, then subjecting copyright to additional
First Amendment scrutiny would be unwarranted. Once again,
Schwartz and Treanor are representative. The authors engage in this
rhetorical sleight of hand when they suggest copyright is no different
than any other form of economic regulation, and that all arguments
for heightened constitutional scrutiny in copyright cases are
inconsistent with the lessons of Lochner.121 Under this view, because
copyright should be treated like all other forms of property,
constitutional challenges to copyright represent the effort of "IP
restrictors" to read into the Constitution "a substantive vision of
governance that was not grounded in either the text of the Clause or
its original understanding."'122 As such, all disagreements over
copyright are disagreements over public policy, and are best left to
Congress and copyright.123 By making copyright and the policies it
represents the primary, if not exclusive, point of reference,
definitional balancing clears the way for Congress and courts to adopt
the property idealist position.
In turn, the complementary approach shifts the terms of the debate
to the level of public policy which increases: 1) the likelihood that the
relevant decision-maker will adopt the idealist position, and 2) the
likelihood that courts will not second guess such decisions. Both
119248
U.S. 215, 246 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
1
201d. at 248-49.
121Schwartz & Treanor,
122Id. at 2393.
23

1

1d. at 2409-10.

supra note 9, at 2390.
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legislators and judges are more likely to adopt the idealist agenda at
the policy level because property idealists have been quite successful
at confining the copyright debate to copyright's role in providing
authors with financial incentives to create new works. And, the
answer to the question, "will increasing copyright protection will
provide copyright owners with greater financial incentives?" is
always yes. 124 The potential for greater financial rewards by allowing
a copyright owner to maximize her financial return on a copyrighted
work always increases the incentive to create. Opponents must then
explain why it would be unfair for those using the copyrighted work
to pay for such a benefit. Unable to raise competing First Amendment
interests, opponents are left to argue that existing financial incentives
are adequate or to argue for alternative methods to create incentives
that impose fewer costs than a property regime, neither of which
directly refute the property idealist claim that greater protection
creates greater incentives.
Furthermore, shifting the terms of the debate increases the
likelihood of judicial deference. Again, Eldred and the CTEA are
illustrative. As a result of the complementary approach, the question
of whether Congress may legitimately extend the length of copyright
protection retroactively is limited to whether the extension will
provide copyright owners with greater financial incentives to create
new works. Because Congress heard testimony from authors and
copyright owners that term extension would provide them with
greater incentives to create new works or to improve existing works,
the Court concluded that Congress's decision was reasonable and
within its discretion. 125 In contrast, Justice Breyer argued that the
financial incentives created by the CTEA were small enough to be
illusory. According to Justice Breyer, some evidence suggested that,
at best, term extension would increase the financial incentives to a
handful of authors by seven cents. 126 "What potential Shakespeare,
Wharton, or Hemingway would be moved by such a sum?' ' 127 Even
so, the majority concluded that "[t]he CTEA reflects judgments of the
kind Congress typically makes, judgments we cannot dismiss as
outside the Legislature's domain."'' 28 So long as there is some
reasonable basis for such a conclusion, term extension is permissible
even if, as Justice Breyer argued in dissent, such incentives are de
minimis.
124Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 344 (2002).
125Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205-08 (2003).
1261d. at 254-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
27
1 Id. at 255.
128Id. at

205 (majority opinion).
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To be clear, I am not suggesting that the Constitution prevents
Congress or the courts from adopting the property idealist's position
as a guiding or interpretive principle, only that the First Amendment
limits how far those institutions may go towards advancing that
agenda. Nevertheless, for all practical purposes, by removing the
limits established by the First Amendment, definitional balancing
reinterprets the Constitution to support the property idealist position.
And yet, if the Constitution does not enact Herbert Spencer's Social
Statics, it similarly does not enact the property idealist's economic
theory. Arguments based upon the claim that copyright and free
speech do not conflict, even as copyright expands beyond the
Framers' copyright, implicitly resolve this conflict at the First
Amendment's expense. Under definitional balancing, property rights
define the limits of the First Amendment rather than the other way
around. In what amounts to Lochner in reverse, definitional balancing
does not read something into the Constitution that is not there, but
rather reads out the express limitations found in the First Amendment.
This copyright Lochnerism effectively transforms the constitutional
relationship between copyright and the First Amendment from one in
which the Constitution defines the limits of copyright to one in which
copyright defines the limits of the Constitution.
CONCLUSION

Copyright and the First Amendment are twin engines for free
expression. No doubt, the Framers intended both to promote
expression. However, there is also no doubt that at times these
engines pull in conflicting directions when fee expression conflicts
with free expression. In this essay, I have endeavored to demonstrate
the limits of relying upon the Framers' intent to resolve such
conflicts. Copyright and free speech may be reconciled by relying
upon what the Framers intended as suggested by the Supreme Court,
but only to a limited extent. It is reasonable to imply from the near
simultaneous adoption of the first Copyright Act and the First
Amendment that the Framers considered their copyright-a right to
prevent commercial vending of copies in direct competition with the
copyright owner-to be consistent with freedom of speech.
Copyright, however, has long since expanded beyond the Framers'
copyright, and reliance upon what the Framers intended only
highlights the First Amendment problems generated by copyright's
expansion.
Rather than relying upon the Framers' intent to reconcile copyright
and the First Amendment in all circumstances, the Framers' copyright
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is a useful metric for determining when First Amendment scrutiny is
justified. If one assumes that the Framers' copyright represented a
careful balancing of freedom of speech and the need to compensate
authors to encourage expression, the Framers' copyright becomes a
valuable baseline for evaluating when changes to copyright should be
subject to First Amendment review. An approach based upon the
Framers' copyright differentiates between challenges to copyright
based upon protecting new forms of expression versus imposing new
limits upon existing expression. The former category of changes to
copyright should not be subject to heightened First Amendment
scrutiny and the latter should. As such, the Framers' copyright
becomes a clear and powerful means for determining when changes
to copyright may have altered the balance between fee expression and
free expression, and provides substance to the Supreme Court's
reference in Eldred to copyright's "traditional contours" in future
cases.
Lastly, a careful evaluation of what the Framers intended reveals
the fundamental flaws associated with the dominant judicial and
scholarly approach to this problem represented by definitional
balancing. By establishing a clear baseline between copyright and the
First Amendment, the Framers' copyright unmasks definitional
balancing as a form of copyright Lochnerism. First, by rejecting the
need for additional constitutional scrutiny when Congress expands
copyright beyond the Framers' copyright, definitional balancing
ignores or manipulates the baseline for evaluating the relationship
between copyright and free speech. Second, by ignoring the baseline
problem, definitional balancing ultimately allows judges to embed
their own disputed vision of property within constitutional law at the
First Amendment's expense. Copyright Lochnerism effectively
transforms the constitutional relationship between copyright and the
First Amendment from one in which the Constitution defines the
limits of copyright to one in which copyright defines the limits of the
Constitution. And, this simply cannot be what the Framers intended.

